• Bell Aliant
• NHTCU & FBI
• Peter Allor
• Marcel van den Berg
• Rainer Böhme
• Bob Burls
• William Cheswick
• Carlos Cid
• Anton Chuvakin
• Dave De Coster
• Lord Errol
• Boris Goranov
• Martijn de Hamer
• Elly van den Heuvel
• Jaap-Henk Hoepman
• Bart Jacobs
• Sari Kajantie
• Mark Koek
• Jos Kuijpers
• Brett Lambo
• Eric Luiijf
• Scott McIntyre
• Milton Mueller
• Pär Österberg Medina
• Carol Overes
• Richard Perlotto
• David Rice
• Marcus Sachs
• Jacques Schuurman
• Alex Shipp
• Lance Spitzner
• Don Stikvoort
• Gigi Tagliapietra
• Jan Joris Vereijken
• Rémon Verkerk
• Randal Vickers
• David Watson
• Tillmann Werner
• Maurice Wessling
• Colin Whittaker
• Georg Wicherski
• Nicholas Witchell
• Dave Woutersen

Mark has been working in internet security since 1999, initially in incident response (working for FIRST, GOVCERT.NL, plus other companies) and, later on, in security auditing and penetration testing. Over the years, he has performed tests at almost 50 clients, mainly in the government and financial sectors. He is currently co-ordinating a team of technical security auditors at Fox-IT (www.fox-it.com). Today, he focuses mainly on managing complicated penetration testing assignments, involving, for example, cryptographic systems, mobile devices, building security, and particularly sensitive critical infrastructure environments.

The Dutch Water Boards are planning to hold national elections in November 2008. As always, they will be holding a postal ballot. Originally the Water Boards planned to offer voters the option of casting their vote using the internet, by means of the "Rijnland Internet Election System" (RIES).

The national government asked Fox-IT to try and find possible security weaknesses in the proposed system. Based (amongst other things) on the results of this audit, the internet voting project was cancelled.

This presentation will outline the (mainly cryptographic) weaknesses that Fox-IT discovered in the proposed internet-voting system.